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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1)

Does a person_waive his right to contest on appeal an

issue which he conceded at trial?
2)

Under·the Uniform Commercial Code, does a wrongful

revocation of acceptance of goods give rise to an action
for the price?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant has filed an Appeal and in his brief
has made a statement of facts setting forth the facts as most
favorable to his position.

Respondent wishes only to state

that, contrary to the allegation in Appellant's Statement of
the Kind of Case, Appellant in fact made a down payment of $310.00
on the organ (transcript of trial, p. 108, line 23), and that,
contrary to Appellant's Statement of Facts, the organ is presently
in Appellant's garage, and not in his home (transcript of trial,
p. 100, line 4).

In all other respects, Respondent 'accepts

Appellant's Statement of Facts.
POINT I
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED ON APPEAL FROM RAISING THE
ISSUE OF ACCEPTANCE.
Counsel for Appellant states in his brief:

"The issue

primarily centers around the appropriate measure of damages."
(p. 1).

He then correctly observes that the issue of damages

hinges on whether or not Appellant accepted the goods in question.
He goes to great lengths to argue that since Appellant effectively
rejected the organ which he purchased from Respondent, he should
be liable only for the damages which he caused Respondent, arvi net
for the contract price.

It is interesting to note, however, th''
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during the discussion regarding jury instructions, Appellant's
attorney conceded that Appellant accepted the organ, and he
did not submit any jury instructions on that question.

At

that time, the defense asserted by Appellant was that of
unconscionability, and there was no evidence at all before
the trial court that the organ was not accepted by the
Appellant, that it was nonconforming, or that Appellant had
not had ample time to inspect it.

Therefore.the trial court

ruled, as a matter of law, that there was acceptance on the
part of the Appellant (record, p. 122).

Ironically, only

after the jury found no unconscionability did Appellant
forward his theory of nonacceptance.
It is a well-established legal principle that on appeal,
parties waive their right to contest issues which they
failed to contest at trial.

Five (5) Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal

and Error §545 (1962) states:
In order to avoid the delay and expense incident
to appeals, reversals, and new trials upon
grounds which might have been corrected in the
trial court if the question had been properly
raised there, the appellate courts have developed
and applied the rule that they will normally
only consider questions which were raised and
reserved in the lower court.
See also 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error §566 (1962);
McGrath vs. Manufacturers Trust Co., 338

u.s.

State vs. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640.

241; and
In the case of

Whewell vs. Dobson, 227 N.W. 2d 115 (1975), it was held that
the buyer of Christmas trees was precluded from arguing on
appeal that the seller failed to perform certain conditions
precedent to his recovery from an action on the price, where
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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instant case, Appellant, as buyer, is now likewise attempting
to argue on appeal that the Respondent cannot recover the
contract price because of the buyer's non-acceptance of the
organ.

It seems patently unfair that Appellant, after

losing the issue of unconscionability at trial, can now
appeal his case on the entirely new theory of non-acceptance,
and it is therefore urged that-Appellant be estopped from
now claiming non-acceptance of the organ.
POINT II
EVEN IF APPELLANT IS PERMITTED TO ARGUE HIS THEORY OF NONACCEPTANCE, THE FACTS INDICATE THAT APPELLANT INDEED ACCEPTED
THE ORGAN, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WRONGFULLY REVOKED THAT ACCEPTANCE.
From the outset we need to establish that under the
Uniform Commercial Code, there is a big difference between a
buyer's rejection of goods and his revocation of acceptance.
White and Summers note that distinction and state:
Rejection is a combination of the buyer's
refusal to keep delivered goods and his
notification to the seller that he will
not keep them.
Revocation of acceptance
is a similar refusal in the buyer's part
to keep goods, but in this case it is a
refusal which comes at a later time in the
transaction and after the buyer has "accepted"
by allowing the time for rejection to pass
or by some act with respect to the goods.
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code
247 (1972).
Nowhere does the Code define "rejection", but it does
define "acceptance".
Section 2-606 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(1}

Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a}

after a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the goods signifies to the
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain_
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
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(b)

fails to make an effective rejection
(subsection (l) of Section 2-602),
but such acceptance does not occur
until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or

(c)

does any act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership; but if such act
is wrongful as against the seller
it is an acceptance only if ratified
by him.

Comment one ( l l under that same section states:

"If

the goods conform to the contract, acceptance amounts only
to the performance by the buyer of one part of his legal
obligation." See also 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code
190 (2nd Ed. 1971). According to comment three (3), "payment
made after tender is always one circumstance tending to
signify acceptance of the goods but in itself it can never
be more than one circumstance and is not conclusive."
66 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §385 (1962), where it states:

See

"If the

buyer pays for the goods or signifies that he will pay for
them, at least where advance payment or payment prior to
examination is not required, the buyer will be deemed to
have accepted the goods.

Moreover, it is indicated that the

act of the buyer in arranging for payment on a deferred or
other basis may constitute acceptance under the Code."

It

therefore appears from the foregoing that after the seller
tenders the goods, the buyer has a reasonable period of time
in which to inspect them, "not only for their conformity,
but also as to whether he wants to take them at all."
Peters, "Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code:

A Road Map for
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Article 2, 1973 Yale Law Journal 199, 241 (1953).
Appellant's brief, pps. 6-7.

Also see

If the buyer does not reject

the goods, or if he signifies to the seller [by paying the
price, etc.] that the goods are conforming or that he will
take or retain them in spite of their non-conformity, then
he has accepted them (§2-606).

After acceptance, the buyer

has no legal right to return the goods to the seller, whether
he wants to or not, unless the goods are nonc.onforrning, and
unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller of such
nonconformity (§2-608).
In the instant case Appellant did not reject the organ,
but instead revoked his acceptance of it.

The trial clearly

established that Appellant received in his horne tender of
the organ.

By agreement between the parties, he was given

two days to inspect it for its conformity and to decide if
he wanted to buy it at all.

Subsequently Appellant decided

he wanted to keep it, and so he made a down payment and
signed the Installment Sale Contract.

At the moment he

signed his name, Appellant accepted the organ, and said in
effect, "I promise to pay for this unless it proves to be
nonconforming."

See White and Summers p. 212.

Two days

later, Appellant revoked his acceptance, and breached his
contract.

There was nothing wrong with the organ.

It

conformed in every respect to Respondent's representations.
Nevertheless, Appellant simply decided that he didn't want
it after all.

He therefore wrongfully revoked his acceptance.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S WRONGFUL REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE GAVE TO RESPONDENT
AN ACTION FOR THE PRICE UNDER THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §2-709.
When Appellant accepted the organ, he became liable for
the contract price.

Section 2-607 of the Uniform Commercial

Code states in part:
(1)

The buyer must pay at the contract rate
for any goods accepted.

(2)

Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes
rejection of the goods accepted.

Comment one (1) under that section further provides
that "Once the buyer accepts a tender, the seller acquires a
right to its price on the contract terms."
When Appellant wrongfully revoked his acceptance,
Respondent was afforded by the contract the appropriate
remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code.

Section 2-703

speaks of the seller's remedies both for wrongful rejection
and for wrongful revocation of acceptance.

It states:

Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes
acceptance of goods . . • the aggrieved seller
may • . . recover damages for non-acceptance
(Section 2-708) or in a proper case the price
(Section 2-709).
The distinction between wrongful rejection and wrongful
revocation of acceptance now becomes crucial.

Wrongful

rejection--or "non-acceptance"--permits an aggrieved seller
to recover only damages under §2-708, while wrongful revocation
of acceptance is the "proper case" for an aggrieved seller
to recover the price under §2-709.

That section (2-709)

states:
(1)

When the buyer fails to pay the price

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damages under the next section, the
price (a) of goods accepted
Comment two (2) further states:
(2)

The action for the price is now generally
limited to those cases where resale of
the goods is impracticable except where
the buyer has accepted the goods or where
they have been destroyed after risk of
loss has passed to the buyer.
(underlining
added)

A proper reading of.the rest of §2-709 clearly shows
that the above quoted portion is, the part which correctly
applies to the instant case, and is totally consistent with
§2-607 and with §2-703.
In his brief for the case at bar, Counsel for Appellant
has either missed or ignored the important distinction
between "rejection {pre-acceptance behavior) and revocation
of acceptance (post-acceptance behavior)."
p. 253.

White and Summers,

Counsel quotes a long passage from White and Summers,

which states that "effective rejections" by the buyer give
rise only to liability for damages, and not for an action on
the price (Appellant's brief, p. 5).
correct, as we have already seen.

That is certainly

But then White and Summers

go on to discuss the appropriate remedy for "effective but
wrongful revocations," and conclude that:
any buyer who accepts goods is liable for the
price unless he makes a procedurally effective and substantially rightful revocation o~cceptance; we believe that a
procedurally effective but substantially
wrongful revocation should not free him
from price liability under §2-709(l)(a).
White and Summers, p. 213.
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Likewise, on page 3 of Appellant's brief, Counsel
quotes from Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service, the
following:
When there is a rejection of goods, the
buyer is not exercising any control or
dominion over them, whether the rejection
is rightful or wrongful.
In essence, it
would be essential for the seller, regardless~of the cause of the rejection, to
recover the goods from the carrier, bailee
or-the buyer. He should take the appropriate
action necessary to accomplish this purpose.
Unfortunately, however, Counsel ended the quotation at
this point and failed to continue:
On the other hand, where there is a revocation
of acceptance, this presupposes a prior acceptance
by the buyer. The seller here should be entitled
to the action for the purchase price because
the goods are in the exclusive control of the
buyer and the additional burden imposed upon the
seller of reclaiming the goods is not necessarily
well placed. 3A Bender's Uniform Commercial
Code Service, 13-76 (1978).
It should be remembered that Appellant never rejected
the organ, either rightfully or wrongfully.

Instead, he

accepted it after having it in his home and under his exclusive
control for two days, by making the down payment and by
signing the Installment Sale Contract.

Two days after he

had accepted the organ, which was conforming, Appellant
revoked his acceptance.

Therefore, the quotations in Appellant's

brief dealing with liability for damages caused by wrongful
rejection, while accurate, are not relevant to the case at
bar; for in fact there was no rejection, but instead a
wrongful revocation of acceptance.

Anderson suggests:

The

seller may recover the contract price with respect to accepted
goods, as to which there has not been any rightful revocation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.,
Nordstrom further observes:
If the seller retakes the goods as the owner,
he ought not also have the claim for their
price under the 'goods accepted' provision of
section 2-709. His remedy is under section
2-708. Of course, if the seller refuses the
attempted wrongful revocation, the goods are
still the buyer's and the seller may recover
the price. Nordstrom, Law of Sales, 544 (1970).
Finally, Squillante and Fonseca have noted that "the
action for price becomes due immediately upon the seller's
delivery of the goods and the buyers default in payment of
the purchase price."

3 Squillante and Fonse6a, Williston on

Sales, 433 (1974).
While admittedly many courts construing the law of
sales have not spoken in precisely the terms of

rejectio~

and revocation of acceptance, most have held that recovery
of the contract price is allowed immediately after the buyer
purchases a conforming good.
vs. Paulson,

See for example D. A. Taylor Co.,

Utah 2d _______ , 552 P.2d 1274 (1976), in

which the Utah Supreme Court observed simply that when a
seller sold and a buyer ordered and accepted some carpet,
the buyer was liable for the price.

Other Courts, however,

have in fact spoken in terms of acceptance and wrongful
revocation of acceptance.

In Beco, Inc., vs. Minnechange

Golf Course, 5 Comm. Cir. 444, 256 A2d 522 (1968) the court
held that when conforming goods have been delivered to, and
accepted by, the buyer, the seller cannot sue for damages
under §2-708 but must sue for the contract price under §2709.

Likewise the court in Haken vs. Sheffler, 24 Mich.

App. 196, 180 N.W. 2d 206 (1970) observed that §2-709 authorize'
an action for the price when goods have been accepted, as
~amages under §2-708, when there has been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contrasted with

a

"non-acceptance" by the buyer.

A Missouri court has held

that an action for the price accrues to the seller when the
goods have been accepted by the buyer.

In that case the

court specifically held that the seller was under no obligation
under the Uniform Commercial Code to respossess or resell
the air conditioners which the buyer had accepted simply
because the buyer subsequently .revoked his acceptance.
R. R. Waites Co., Inc., vs. E. H. Thrift Air Conditioning, Inc.,
510 S. W. 2d 759 (Mo. 1974).

In the instant case the Appellant

has wrongfully revoked his acceptance of the organ.

But he

should not be able to revoke his liability for the price
under the contract.
POINT IV
ANY ERRORS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT WERE HARMLESS.
In his brief, Counsel for Appellant argues that the
trial court's jury instructions where both erroneous and
inadequate.

Specifically he argues that since the court

refused to read two sections .of the Uniform Commercial Code
to the jury, counsel for Appellant was denied the opportunity
to argue the elements of rejection .and acceptance.

It seems

unusual that counsel would blame the court for failing to
raise an issue which he himself failed to raise at trial.
Counsel was given ample opportunity to argue non-acceptance
of the organ, but was preoccupied with trying to prove
unconscionable selling techniques on the part of Respondent,
and subsequent mental anguish on the part of Appellant.

In

his brief, counsel for Appellant cites Cervitor Kitchens, Inc.,
Vs. Chapman, 7 Wash. App. 520, 500 P.2d 783 (1972), which
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held that the reasonable time for inspection of the goods by
the buyer before he will be deemed to have accepted them is
a.question of fact if the facts are disputed.

In the

instant case those facts simply were not disputed at trial,
and there was no reason for the jury to decide something
which was not in issue, regardless of whether, in retrospect,
counsel wishes it had been.

Counsel for Appellant failed to

mention in his brief that the above cited case then went on
to say that if, as here, the facts are undisputed concerning
the duration of time for inspection by the buyer of the
delivered goods, the question as to whether the buyer has
accepted the goods and is therefore liable for the price,
becomes one for the court to dec ide.

See also LaVilla Fair vs.

Lewis Carpet Mills, Inc., 219 Kan. 395, 545 P.2d 825 (1976).
In the instant case the facts concerning the amount of time
in which Appellant was given to reject the organ were undisputed.
By agreement between the parties he was given two days.

The

court simply held, therefore, that as a matter of law,
Appellant had accepted the organ, and was liable for the
price (record, p. 122).
As to counsel's exception to the "forced sale" instructior.,

1

'
it must be pointed out that even if, arguendo, the measure
of damages was erroneous, it did not prejudice Appellant's
case in any way.

The jury decided the issue of unconscionabillt)'

against Appellant, and therefore the question of damages or
set-off to Appellant became a nullity.
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As to Respondent's burden of proof, Respondent clearly
alleged and proved the making of the contract and Appellant's
subsequent breaching thereof.

Any allegations of rejection

or non-acceptance should have been raised at trial as an
affirmative defense by Appellant.

See Corbin, Contracts

981, 698 (1952).
CONCLUSION
Since Appellant failed to contest at trial that he had
accepted the organ, he should be estopped on appeal from
claiming non-acceptance.

Even if he is permitted to allege

non-acceptance, however, the facts indicate that Appellant
indeed did accept the organ, but later wrongfully revoked
that acceptance.

The appropriate statutes and all the

authorities suggest that a wrongful revocation of a contract
gives rise to an action for the price.

It is therefore

urged that the judgment of the Trial Court be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,

GARY N. ANDERSON
175 East First North
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorney for Respondent
Keith Jorgensen
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